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This article lists the requirements of European data protection law as regards the
contents  of  a  contract  between cloud provider  and cloud client.  Based on these
requirements  the  contracts  for  the  provision  of  Google  Apps  for  Work  and
Microsoft Office 365 for small and medium enterprises are evaluated and compared
from the data protection perspective. The article also discusses the shortcomings of
the current legal framework for data protection with regard to cloud computing,
and  analyses  the  possible  improvements  made  by  the  General  Data  Protection
Regulation.
A cloud client usually plays the role of a data controller, while the provider may
be  a  data  controller,  data  processor  or  may  not  fall  under  the  scope  of  data
protection law. The relationship between the client and cloud provider, as a data
processor, must be governed by a contract stating that the provider is bound by the
instructions of the client, and describing the security measures. 
The contract  for  Microsoft  Office  365 was  found to  be compliant with data
protection  law.  The  contract  for  Google  Apps  for  Work  suffers  from  several
deficiencies that may cause a breach of data protection law. 
The current data protection framework lacks unification, clarity, scalability and
balance  regarding liability.  With the  exception of  unification,  the General  Data
Protection Regulation is not expected to bring a substantial improvement if it is
adopted using the proposed wording. To cope with the problems arising from the
interaction of cloud contracts with current law, cloud clients and providers may
use the Cloud Service Level Agreement Standardisation Guidelines.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The concept of cloud computing is not entirely new and there is no need to
introduce  it  to  the  reader  at  length.  Cloud  computing  may  simply  be
defined as a set of hosted IT services delivered on a shared internet-based
platform.1 If a cloud client operates in the European Union (EU) and the
data processed using the cloud service may serve to identify any physical
person, the provision of the service may fall under the regime of Directive
95/46/EC  on  protection  of  individuals  with  regard  to  the  processing  of
personal  data  (DPD).  The  DPD  sets  a  number  of  requirements  on  the
relationship between the cloud client and the cloud provider. 
Cloud  solutions  should  bring  substantial  efficiency  improvements  in
particular  to  small  and  medium  enterprises  (SMEs)  which  can  neither
usually afford nor fully exploit  large scale dedicated IT solutions.2 In the
EU, SMEs most frequently use cloud email and data storage.3 These services
form the category of software-as-a-service (SaaS) and are often integrated in
online office suites such as Microsoft Office 365 or Google Apps for Work.
However, for SMEs it may be difficult to assess the products of these cloud
providers from the data protection perspective since the legal regulations as
well as the contractual frameworks of the providers are often very complex.
The aim of this article is, therefore, firstly to lists the requirements of the
DPD regarding the contents of contracts between cloud provider and cloud
client  with  consideration  of  the  provisions  of  some  national  legislation.
Secondly,  based  on  these  requirements,  the  contracts  for  provision  of
Google  Apps  for  Work  and  Microsoft  Office  365  to  small  and  medium
enterprises will be evaluated and compared from the data protection angle.
Finally, the shortcomings of the current legal framework for data protection
1 KPMG, 2012, Exploring the Cloud: A Global Study of Government´s Adoption of Cloud,
viewed  15  February  2015,
<http://www.kpmg.com/AU/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/cloud-
computing/Documents/exploring-the-cloud-government-adoption.pdf>.
2 European Commission, 27 September 2012,  Unleashing the Potential of Cloud Computing in
Europe, viewed 15 February 2015, p.4. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri=COM:2012:0529:FIN:EN:PDF>.
3 eurostat,  16  January  2015,  Use  of  cloud  computing  services,  viewed  15  February  2015,
<http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=isoc_cicce_use&lang=en>.
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with  regard  to  cloud  computing  will  be  discussed,  and  possible
improvements  brought  about by the  General  Data  Protection Regulation
will be analysed.
2. DATA PROTECTION IN THE CLOUD
The  data  protection  obligations  of  the  clients  and  providers  in  cloud
computing  strongly  depend  on  the  roles  that  they  are  assigned  in  any
particular relationship under the DPD. If the data or a part of it  may be
considered to be personal data in the sense of the DPD and it is processed in
the cloud then at least one of the persons must be a data controller. A data
controller under the DPD is the individual that “defines the purpose and
measures of the processing”.4 In the case of those cloud services that are not
made-to-measure  for  an  individual  customer,  it  is  always  the  cloud
provider who determines the properties of the service,  and the room for
negotiation of individual parameters may be very limited. It may seem that
these choices put the provider in the position of a data controller.5 However,
it is the decision of the cloud client to accept the offer of a particular cloud
provider that determines the means of the processing;6 therefore the client
should be considered to be the controller of the personal data in question.
This, however, does not exclude the possibility of the provider being a
controller too. If the provider decides to use the data for other purposes
than chosen by the client, the provider may also become a data controller.
This  is  possible  where  the  cloud  provider  openly  uses  the  data  for
marketing  and  advertising  purposes  (such  as  providing  targeted
advertisements  to the service  users),  as well  as in  those cases  where the
provider exceeds the instructions of the client.7
In  most  other  situations  the  provider  will  be  a  data  processor  –  the
person  processing  personal  data  on  behalf  of  the  controller.8 This
4 Article 2 para. (d) of the Directive 95/46/EC on protection of individuals  with regard to
processing of personal data.
5 This possibility is discussed by Hon, KW, Millard, C, Walden, I 2012, 'Who is responsible
for ‘personal data’  in  cloud computing?—The cloud of unknowing,  Part  2',  International
Data Privacy Law, 2011, vol. 2, no. 1, p. 6.
6 Article  29  Data  Protection  Working  Party,  2012,  Opinion  05/2012  on Cloud Computing
(WP196), viewed 11 February 2015, p.8. <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-
29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2012/wp196_en.pdf> .
7 See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 2006, Opinion 10/2006 on the processing of 
personal data by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT), 
viewed 11 February 2015, p.26., 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2006/wp128_en.pdf>.
8  WP196, supra note 6, p. 7.
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assignment  of  roles  is  anticipated  by  Article  29  of  the  Data  Protection
Working Party (a body of European data protection authorities), as well as
many  individual  data  protection  authorities,  in  their  opinions  and
guidelines on the processing of personal data in the cloud.9 
However,  when the  cloud provider  only  provides  the  customer  with
storage capacity for unstructured data (i.e.  not, for example, content wise
document  storage  with  search  options  etc.)  or  computing  power,  the
provider may not be (and usually is not) aware of the nature of the data the
customer decides to process using the resources provided.  Therefore, the
position of the provider would change depending on what type of data the
customer would decide to process without the provider’s knowledge. Such
an assignment of roles may result in unbalanced outcomes, encumbering
both the cloud client and provider with a burden of obligations which are
disproportionate  to  the  potential  risk  brought  by  the contribution  of  the
cloud provider to the operations of the cloud client.10 
A  solution  to  this  problem  may  be  the  application  of  Directive
2000/31/EC on electronic commerce (ECD).11 This directive creates a system
of safe harbors shielding certain providers of information society services
from liability. Among the shielded providers are also providers of hosting
services,12 who  are  not  liable  for  information  stored  by  the  user  of  the
service  unless  they  have  “actual  knowledge  of  illegal  activity  or
information.”13
If the DPD is viewed as a general rule for all data processors, and the
ECD as  a  special  rule  on  liability  issues  which  is  also  applicable  to  the
treatment of personal data by hosting providers (i.e. if we would say that
9 Czech  Data  Protection  Office.  2013, Communication  of  Czech  Data  Protection  Office  No.
65/2013/4,  viewed  11  February  2015,  p.3.,
<https://www.uoou.cz/VismoOnline_ActionScripts/File.ashx?
id_org=200144&id_dokumenty=3002> ,(Czech DPO Communication).
Information Commissioner’s Office. 2012,  Guidance on the use of cloud computing (UK ICO
Guidance),  viewed  11  February  2015,p.8.,  <https://ico.org.uk/media/for-
organisations/documents/1540/cloud_computing_guidance_for_organisations.pdf>,  (UK
ICO Guidance). 
Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, 2013, Guía para clientes que contraten servicios de 
Cloud Computing, viewed 11 February 2015, p. 13., 
<http://www.agpd.es/portalwebAGPD/canaldocumentacion/publicaciones/common/Guias/
GUIA_Cloud.pdf> ,(Spanish DPO Guidance).
10 Hon, Millard, Walden, supra note 5, p. 11.
11 Hon, Millard, Walden, supra note 5, p. 11.
12 Hosting being “an information society service is provided that consists of the storage of
information  provided  by  a  recipient  of  the  service,”  Article  14  para.  1  of  the  Directive
2000/31/EC on electronic commerce.
13 Article 14 para. 1(a) of the Directive 2000/31/EC on electronic commerce.
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the personal scope of the ECD is narrower than that of the DPD), then the
liability  of  hosting providers  for the processing of personal data may be
excluded.14 However, it remains disputable as to whether all the obligations
of the data processor may fall under the term ‘liability’. 
Nonetheless, even if we conclude that the exclusion of hosting providers
from  controllership  under  the  DPD  is  possible,  it  will  apply  only  to
providers  of  content  neutral  resources  such  as  storage  or  computing
power.15 In the case  of Google Apps for Work,  Microsoft  Office  365 and
similar SaaS solutions, the situation is quite different. It is obvious that data
processed using these services will be sufficient to identify individual users,
and this has to be considered as personal data under the DPD. Therefore,
we  may  assume  that  the  use  of  the  services  constitutes  data  processing
under the DPD, with the cloud client being the data controller and the cloud
provider being the data processor.
This  assignment  of  roles  sets  many  requirements  regarding  the  legal
relationship  between  the  cloud  provider  and  client.  The  first  and  most
essential is the existence of a legal act governing the relationship between
the cloud client as data controller and cloud provider as data processor.16
While the DPD does not specify the type of the act, national legislation often
requires it to take the form of a contract.17 The contract (usually called a data
processing agreement) should be in writing or in other equivalent forms.18
The DPD requires the contract to stipulate that “the processor shall act
only on instructions from the controller.”19 Adherence to the principle of
purpose limitation20 is an essential obligation of the provider; the purpose of
the  processing  should  be  outlined  in  the  contract.21 To  ensure  that  only
14 This  opinion  is  also  taken by Sator,  G.  2013,  ‘Providers'  liabilities  in  the  new EU Data
Protection Regulation: A threat to Internet freedoms?’, in: International Data Privacy Law,
vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 3-12.
15 Most of the services would fall under the category of infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS). 
16 Article 17 para. 3 of the Directive 95/46/EC on protection of individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data..
17 Schedule  1,  part  II,  para.  12  of  the  Data  Protection Act  1998  (UK Data  Protection  Act).
Article 6 of Zákon č. 101/2000 Sb., o ochraně osobních údajů (Czech Data Protection Act).
Article 12 para. 2 of Ley Orgánica 15/1999, de 13 de diciembre, de Protección de Datos de
Carácter Personal (Spanish Data Protection Act). 
18 Article 17 para. 4 of the Directive 95/46/EC on protection of individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data.
19 Article 17 para. 3 of the Directive 95/46/EC on protection of individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data.
20 Article 6 para. 1(b) of the Directive 95/46/EC on protection of individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data.
21 See Svantesson, DJB 2012, ‘Data protection in cloud computing – The Swedish Perspective’,
Computer Law & Security Review 28, 2012, p. 478.
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legally obtained data for a particular purpose are processed using a cloud
service, the contract should state the types of personal data processed.22
Article  29  of  the  Data  Protection  Working  Party`s  opinion  on  cloud
computing  further  recommends  that  the  contract  contain  details  on  the
client’s  instructions to be issued to the provider.23 While the necessity of
these requirements for detail has no explicit basis in the DPD, their absence
may render a contract unenforceable, and, therefore, cause a conflict with
Article 6 para. 3 of the DPD.
The  second  key  obligation  of  the  cloud  provider,  which  must  be
included in a contract, is the obligation to comply with the agreed technical
and  organizational  measures  established  to  protect  personal  data.24 The
DPD does not specify the particular measures that must be implemented to
protect  personal  data;  however there are some national  implementations
that state specific requirements or measures aimed at various risk profiles
(for example, in  Spain or Poland25).  A data processing agreement should
also equip the cloud client with the tools that will enable them to supervise
the provider’s compliance with these measures, as well as with remedies for
a situation in which the duty of compliance would be broken.26 
The cloud provider should be obliged to provide the cloud client with
sufficient proof of the provider’s compliance, such as security certification
or an audit report, for example ISO 27001, or a recent standard concerning
the  processing  of  personally  identifiable  information  in  the  cloud –  ISO
27018. 
As to the remedies, cloud clients remain primarily liable for any security
incident occurring in the course of the processing;27 they should therefore be
22 WP196, supra note 6, p. 13.
23 WP196, supra note 6, p. 12. See also Svantesson, supra note 21, p. 479.
24 Article 6 para 1 and 3 of the Directive 95/46/EC on protection of individuals with regard to
the processing of personal data.
25 An implementing directive for the Spanish Data Protection Act sets security measures for
low, medium and high level of protection. Article 80 Real Decreto 1720/2007, Reglamento de
desarrollo  de  la  Ley  Orgánica  15/1999,  de  13  de diciembre,  de  protección  de  datos  de
carácter personal. Similar principle is applied by Article 6 para 2 Rozporządzenie Ministra
spraw  wewnętrznych  i  administracji  Dz.  U.  z  2004  r.  Nr  100,  poz.  1024,  w  sprawie
dokumentacji  przetwarzania  danych  osobowych  oraz  warunków  technicznych  i
organizacyjnych, jakim powinny odpowiadać urządzenia i systemy informatyczne służące
do przetwarzania danych osobowych.
26 WP196, supra note 6, p. 13.
27 This is stressed by  Svantesson, supra note 21, pp. 479. Similarly, imbalance in liability is
seen  as  a  main  issue  by  McGillivray,  K  2014.  ‘Conflicts  in  the  Cloud:  Contracts  and
Compliance with Data Protection Law in the EU’, Tulane Journal of Technology & Intellectual
Property, 17 (2014), p.248.
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able to contractually transfer an appropriate part of the liability to the cloud
provider, whose liability will not be limited to an extent that could almost
completely let the liability rest with the cloud client. Furthermore, the cloud
client should be able to terminate a data processing agreement, if they find
material non-compliance with agreed measures that are not remedied by
the provider in a reasonable time.
All the terms of the data processing agreement should be the result of
consensus  and should  not  be  changed by  a  sole  decision  of  one  of  the
parties. Therefore, with regard to a data processing agreement, at least the
basic  terms  of  the  contract  regarding  the  instructions  of  the  client  and
security measures should not be unilaterally changeable.28
Similarly, all the conditions stipulated in the data processing agreement
must hold even if subcontractors are used by the provider. The terms of the
subcontract should with regard to data protection follow the terms of the
data  processing  agreement.  The  client  should  be  informed  as  to  all  the
subcontractors engaged in the processing of personal data and the contract
should at least provide for prior notice of employment of the subcontractor
with a sufficiently advanced notice period, as well as the right for the cloud
client to terminate the contract in the event that they do not approve of the
new subcontractor.29
The contract should ensure that the cloud provider is obliged to assist
the cloud client  in fulfilling requests of the subjects of the personal data
processed using the service.30 A procedure and time frame for the deletion
of  data  following  the  termination  of  the  contract  should  be  clearly
described.31 
The last key requirement in a data processing agreement is related to the
location  of  the  processed  data.  Without  information  on  data  location,  a
cloud client cannot be sure that they comply with the requirement on the
cross-border  transfers  of  personal  data.  Personal  data  may  only  be
28 See  Svantesson,  supra  note  21,  p.  477.  Similarly,  see  Similarly,  see  Debussche,  J,  Van
Asbroeck, B, Chloupek et al. 24 November 2014, ‘Cloud computing and privacy series: the data
protection  legal  framework,  part  2  of  6,  viewed  in  11  February  2015
<http://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2014/global/cloud-computing-and-privacy-
series-the-data-protection-legal-framework>.
29 WP196, supra note 6, p. 11. Similarly, see Svantesson, supra note 21, p. 477, Debussche, Van
Asbroeck, Chloupek et al., supra note 28, or McGillivray, supra note 27, p.246.
30 WP196,  supra  note  6,  p.  13.  See  also  Svantesson,  supra  note  21,  p.  478.  Rights  of  data
subjects are stated, namely in Articles 12, 14 and 15 of the Directive 95/46/EC on protection
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data.
31 WP 169, supra note 6, p. 13.  Article 6 para 1(e) of the  Directive 95/46/EC on protection of
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data.
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transferred outside the EU to countries with an adequate level of protection
as  determined by decisions of the European Commission.32 Data may be
freely transferred to the US if the cloud provider, as a recipient of the data,
is  certified  in  a  Safe  Harbor  program  organised  by  the  Department  of
Commerce, and remains certified throughout the course of the processing.
To so-called third countries lacking an adequate level of protection personal
data may be transferred on the condition that the parties adhere to specific
Binding  Corporate  Rules,  but  the  process  of  approval  for  such  rules  is
complicated and usually too costly for SMEs.33
The second possible way in order to enable personal data transfer to a
third country lacking an adequate level of protection is incorporation of the
Standard Contractual Clauses from Commission Decision 2010/87/EU into
the  data  processing  agreement.34 The  aim  of  Commission  Decision
2010/87/EU  is  to  overcome  the  absence  of  adequate  protection  in  a
destination  country  by means  of  contractual  safeguards.  These  Standard
Contractual  Clauses  are  not  required  to  be  the  only  clauses  of  the  data
processing agreement, but no other business related clauses included in the
contract shall contradict them,35 otherwise the established protection would
not be sufficient.
There are of course many other matters that should be address in the
contracts  as  contributing  to  best  practice  in  data  protection,  such  as
notification of law enforcement access to the data or interoperability,36 but
none of these are strictly required under the DPD. 
3. ANALYSIS OF CONTRACTS
3.1 GOOGLE APPS FOR WORK
The provision  of Google Apps for  Work to its  users  is  governed by the
Google Apps Enterprise  (Online)  Agreement37 (GA Agreement)  which  is
concluded upon registration for the services. This agreement may be further
amended by accepting a Data Processing Amendment to a Google Apps
32 Article  25  of  the  Directive  95/46/EC  on  protection  of  individuals  with  regard  to  the
processing of personal data.
33 McGillivray, supra note 27, p. 243.
34 Articles 27 and 26 para 4 of the Directive 95/46/EC on protection of individuals with regard
to the processing of personal data.
35 Recital 4 of the Commission Decision 2010/87/EU.
36 WP196, supra note 6, p. 13.
37 Google February 2014, Google Apps Enterprise (Online) Agreement, viewed 11 February
2015, <https://www.google.com/intx/cs/work/apps/terms/2014/2/premier_terms_ie.html>.
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Agreement38 (DP Amendment) or Model contract clauses for Google Apps39
(MCCs). However, acceptance of such additional contractual documents is
voluntary and requires a specific procedure to be performed by the client at
the administration console.40 For customers located in the EU, the contract is
concluded with Google Commerce Limited (Google).
On its own, the GA Agreement does not satisfy the basic requirements of
a  data  processing  agreement,  since  the  security  measures  established  to
protect the personal data of the client are not sufficiently addressed. 
Section 2.2 of the GA Agreement states for which purposes Google may
process client data. Instructions of the client are sufficiently addressed in
the contract.41 However the contract does not describe what kind of data
will be processed under the agreement as is recommended by Article 29 of
the  Working  Party`s  opinion  on  cloud  computing.42 Other  details  with
regard  to  client  instructions,  such  as  the  Service  Level  Agreement,  are
treated with acceptable detail in the contract.
A  shortcoming  of  the  GA  Agreement  is  the  treatment  of  security
measures. The agreement only states that “Google will take and implement
appropriate  technical  and  organisational  measures  to  protect  Customer
Data  against  accidental  or  unlawful  destruction  or  accidental  loss,
alteration, unauthorised disclosure or access,” without any further detail.
Such a general description does not satisfy the requirements of the DPD. 
Google addresses this defect of the GA Agreement by offering its EU
based clients the option of concluding a DP Amendment, but this option is
not automatically suggested to the clients.43 The DP Amendment overcomes
some of the issues of the GA Agreement. The types of data processed are
described  in  Appendix  1  to  the  GA  Amendment.  However,  the  most
important  improvement  is  the  description  of  the  implanted  security
38 Google 2015, Data Processing Amendment to Google Apps Agreement, viewed 11 February 2015,
<https://www.google.com/intx/en/work/apps/terms/dpa_terms.html>.
39 Google  2015,  Standard  Contractual  Clauses  (processors)for  the  purposes  of  Article  26(2)  of
Directive 95/46/EC for the transfer of personal data to processors  established  in  third  countries
which  do  not  ensure  an  adequate  level  of  data  protection ,  viewed  11  February  2015,
<https://www.google.com/intx/en/work/apps/terms/mcc_terms.html>.
40 Google  2015,  Model  contract  clauses  for  Google  Apps,  viewed  11  February  2015,
<https://support.google.com/a/answer/2888485?hl=en>.
41 Section 15 of the Google February 2014, Google Apps Enterprise (Online) Agreement, 
viewed 11 February 2015, 
<https://www.google.com/intx/cs/work/apps/terms/2014/2/premier_terms_ie.html>.
42  WP196,  supra note  6,  p.  13.  The definition of the term Customer Data is  too broad in
Section 15 to satisfy this requirement.
43 For example as a part of the “Getting Started” guide displayed upon the first sign-in to the
services.
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measures in Appendix 2 to the DP Amendment. This description is detailed
and enables the client to evaluate whether these measures are adequate for
their risk profile.
With  regard  to  the  proof  of  actual  implementation  of  the  measures,
Google  pledges  it  will  maintain  ISO/IEC  27001:2005  certification  or  a
comparable  certification  for  the  services  during  the  term  of  the  GA
Agreement44 and  SSAE  No.  16  Type  II  /  ISAE  No.  3402  report  or  a
comparable report  on logical  security  controls,  physical  security  controls
and system availability of the systems used for provision of the services.45
These contractual obligations should suffice to ensure Google’s compliance
with security measures.
Concerning the remedies for a case of non-compliance with the security
measures,  the contract enables the client  to terminate it  on a breach.46 In
addition, a client may claim damages against Google, but Google’s liability
is  considerably  limited  under the  GA Agreement.47 The limitation  is  not
applicable  to liability for “misuse  of confidential  information.”48 It  is  not
clear how to interpret this exemption; however the word “misuse” rather
suggests that  only intentional,  not  negligent,  conduct  would be covered.
The client may, therefore, bear a disproportionate portion of the liability for
a breach that they are unable to prevent. 
Google is entitled to unilaterally change the services,  and the client is
provided with no remedy for the instance  that such a change negatively
influences their compliance with data protection law.49 Furthermore, Google
44 Section 2.8 of the Google February 2014, Google Apps Enterprise (Online) Agreement, viewed 
11 February 2015, 
<https://www.google.com/intx/cs/work/apps/terms/2014/2/premier_terms_ie.html>. and 6.4 
of the Google 2015, Data Processing Amendment to Google Apps Agreement, viewed 11 
February 2015, <https://www.google.com/intx/en/work/apps/terms/dpa_terms.html>.
45 Section 2.9 of the Google February 2014, Google Apps Enterprise (Online) Agreement, viewed 
11 February 2015, 
<https://www.google.com/intx/cs/work/apps/terms/2014/2/premier_terms_ie.html>. and 6.5 
of the Google 2015, Data Processing Amendment to Google Apps Agreement, viewed 11 
February 2015, <https://www.google.com/intx/en/work/apps/terms/dpa_terms.html>.
46 Section 11.1 of the Google February 2014, Google Apps Enterprise (Online) Agreement, viewed 
11 February 2015, 
<https://www.google.com/intx/cs/work/apps/terms/2014/2/premier_terms_ie.html>.
47 Sections 13.1 and 13.2 of the Google February 2014, Google Apps Enterprise (Online) 
Agreement, viewed 11 February 2015, 
<https://www.google.com/intx/cs/work/apps/terms/2014/2/premier_terms_ie.html>.
48 Section 13.1 of the Google February 2014, Google Apps Enterprise (Online) Agreement, viewed 
11 February 2015, 
<https://www.google.com/intx/cs/work/apps/terms/2014/2/premier_terms_ie.html>..
49 Section 1.2 of the Google February 2014, Google Apps Enterprise (Online) Agreement, viewed 
11 February 2015, 
<https://www.google.com/intx/cs/work/apps/terms/2014/2/premier_terms_ie.html>.
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may change the security measures guaranteed by Appendix 2 to the DP
Amendment.  Although  “any  such  change  shall  not  cause  a  material
degradation in the security of the Services,”50 there is no guarantee that the
modified measures will indeed match the risk profile of the client.
As  to  subcontracting,  the  GA  Agreement  entitles  Google  to  use
subcontractors  on  the  condition  that  such  subcontracts  will  respect  the
terms of the GA agreement with regard to access to and use of a client’s
data.  The  client  is  entitled  to  request  information  regarding  the
subcontractors  and  their  location.51 The  client  may  not  refuse  any
subcontractor that is not considered to be acceptable by them from the data
protection perspective.
When the service provision is terminated, Google is obliged to delete the
client’s data within a maximum period of 180 days.52 Similarly, the access to,
correction  and deletion  of  the  data  are  sufficiently  addressed  in  the  DP
Amendment  to  enable  the  client  to  comply  with  any  requests  of  data
subjects.53 
The location of the processing may vary, since Google may transfer a
client’s data to “the United States or any other country in which Google and
its  Subprocessors  maintain  facilities,”54 which  may  potentially  be  any
country.  Hence,  it  must  be  counted  on  that  data  will  be  transferred  to
countries even without an adequate level of personal data protection. For
this eventuality Google offers the client an option of entering into the MCCs
containing  the  Standard  contractual  clauses  issued  by  the  European
Commission;  however  not  exercising  this  option  does  not  influence  the
functioning of the services. Clients who do not opt for the MCCs, therefore,
potentially  allow  illegal  cross-border  transfer  of  the  personal  data  they
control.
50 Appendix  2  to  the  Google  2015,  Data  Processing  Amendment  to  Google  Apps  Agreement,
viewed  11  February  2015,
<https://www.google.com/intx/en/work/apps/terms/dpa_terms.html>.
51 Section 2.15 of the Google February 2014, Google Apps Enterprise (Online) Agreement, viewed 
11 February 2015, 
<https://www.google.com/intx/cs/work/apps/terms/2014/2/premier_terms_ie.html>.
52 Section 7.2 of the Google 2015, Data Processing Amendment to Google Apps Agreement, viewed
11 February 2015, <https://www.google.com/intx/en/work/apps/terms/dpa_terms.html>.t.
53 Sections 7.1 and 8 of the Google 2015, Data Processing Amendment to Google Apps Agreement ,
viewed  11  February  2015,
<https://www.google.com/intx/en/work/apps/terms/dpa_terms.html>.
54 Section  10.1  of  the  Google  2015,  Data  Processing  Amendment  to  Google  Apps  Agreement,
viewed  11  February  2015,
<https://www.google.com/intx/en/work/apps/terms/dpa_terms.html>.
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The wording of the MCCs used by Google differs from that wording
issued by the European Commission by the addition of an extra paragraph
concerning liability to Clause 6. This paragraph no. 4 states that each party’s
aggregate liability under or in connection with the MCCs is limited to the
amount paid to Google for the services in the previous 12 months. From the
wording “without prejudice to paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Clause 6,” it is not
clear whether paragraph 4 does not limit the liability under paragraphs 1, 2
and 3, or simply does not exclude its existence while capping its height. The
second interpretation would seem to be intended by Google as it follows the
limitation of liability introduced into the GA Agreement.55 However, it may
be found by the data protection authorities that this limitation contradicts
the previous paragraphs of the liability clause. 
Another issue that may constitute a contradiction to MCCs was already
discussed. The difficulty is the choice of the auditor, which is fully left to
Google under the DP Amendment, while the MCCs require the auditor to
be chosen “by the Data Exporter, where applicable, in agreement with the
supervisory authority.”56
3.2 MICROSOFT OFFICE 365
The basic provisions regulating the relationship are given by the Microsoft
Online  Subscription Agreement57 (MOS Agreement) and Privacy Notice58
which are agreed upon by the client when purchasing the paid version of
the  services.  The  most  important  document  referenced  by  the  MOS
Agreement  are the  Online  Services  Terms59 (OS Terms)  which  detail  the
terms for the provision of online services including Office 365. The MOS
Agreement  is  concluded  with  Microsoft  Ireland  Operations  Limited
(Microsoft).
55 Sections 13 of the Google February 2014, Google Apps Enterprise (Online) Agreement, viewed 
11 February 2015, 
<https://www.google.com/intx/cs/work/apps/terms/2014/2/premier_terms_ie.html>.
56 Clause 5(f)  of  the Google 2015,  Standard Contractual  Clauses  (processors)for the  purposes  of
Article 26(2) of Directive 95/46/EC for the transfer of personal data to processors established in third
countries  which do not ensure an adequate  level of data protection,  viewed 11 February 2015,
<https://www.google.com/intx/en/work/apps/terms/mcc_terms.html>.
57 Microsoft  2015,  Microsoft  Online  Subscription  Agreement,  viewed  13  February  2015  ,
<portal.office.com/Commerce/Mosa.aspx?cl=en&cc=en-UK>  (available  only  upon
registration for the services, no up to date and publicly available wording was found).
58 Microsoft  2015,  Privacy  Notice,  viewed  13  February  2015,
<http://www.microsoft.com/online/legal/v2/?docid=18&langid=en-UK>.
59 Microsoft  2015,  Online  Services  Terms  January  1,  2015,  viewed  13  February  2015,
<http://www.microsoftvolumelicensing.com/Downloader.aspx?DocumentId=8248>.
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The  basics  of  the  data  processing  agreement  are  regulated  by  the
Additional European Terms Subsection of the OS Terms, which state that
Microsoft is a data processor acting on their client’s behalf and that it will
act only upon instructions of the client. With regard to the purpose of the
processing the OS Terms state that “Customer Data will  be used only to
provide Customer the Online Services including purposes compatible with
providing those services.”60 Categories of the processed data are specified as
“e-mail, documents and other data in an electronic form in the context of
the Online Services.”61 The scope of the client’s instructions is only given by
the MOS Agreement and the OS Terms.62
The OS Terms describe the security measures implemented by Microsoft.
The description is  general but addresses a large number of areas.63 With
regard to  proof  of  implementation,  Microsoft  will  make available  to  the
client its security policy compliant with ISO 27001 and 27002 standards, and
have such security audited by an independent third party professional. A
summary of the report resulting from the audit shall be made available to
the client at their request.64
The MOS Agreement does not entitle the client to terminate the contract
specifically for breach of Microsoft’s obligation. However, even with a long
term subscription, the client may terminate the services for cause with a one
month termination period with the right to a refund for the remainder of
the subscription.65 Besides that, the right to terminate the contract for non-
compliance with instructions of the client or Standard contractual clauses
issued by the European Commission is granted by Clause 5(b) of the clauses
included in Attachment 3 to the OS Terms. 
60 General Privacy and Security Terms Section, para. Use of Customer Data of the Microsoft
2015,  Online  Services  Terms  January  1,  2015,  viewed  13  February  2015,
<http://www.microsoftvolumelicensing.com/Downloader.aspx?DocumentId=8248>.
61 Appendix 1 to the Standard Contractual Clauses in Attachement 3 to the  Microsoft 2015,
Online  Services  Terms  January  1,  2015,  viewed  13  February  2015,
<http://www.microsoftvolumelicensing.com/Downloader.aspx?DocumentId=8248>.
62 Data Processing Terms Section, Additional European Terms Subsection, para. Intent of the
Parties  of the Microsoft 2015,  Online  Services  Terms January 1,  2015,  viewed 13 February
2015, <http://www.microsoftvolumelicensing.com/Downloader.aspx?DocumentId=8248>.
63 Data Processing Terms Section, Security Subsection of the Microsoft 2015,  Online Services
Terms  January  1,  2015,  viewed  13  February  2015,
<http://www.microsoftvolumelicensing.com/Downloader.aspx?DocumentId=8248>.
64 Data Processing Terms Section, Certifications and Audits Subsection of the Microsoft 2015,
Online  Services  Terms  January  1,  2015,  viewed  13  February  2015,
<http://www.microsoftvolumelicensing.com/Downloader.aspx?DocumentId=8248>.
65 Section 3 para. b(ii) of the Microsoft 2015, Microsoft Online Subscription Agreement, viewed 13
February 2015 , <portal.office.com/Commerce/Mosa.aspx?cl=en&cc=en-UK> (available only
upon registration for the services, no up to date and publicly available wording was found).
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The  liability  of  Microsoft  for  damages  caused  by  a  breach  of  its
obligations under the MOS Agreement is strictly limited66 and liability for
certain damages is excluded.67 This limitation leaves the client a significant
portion of the burden of liability with regard to the data subject. 
Neither the MOS Agreement nor the OS Terms allow unilateral changes.
The contract may only be changed upon expiration of its term through the
due renewal procedure.68
By agreeing to the MOS Agreement, the client also agrees to Microsoft’s
use  of  subcontractors.69 Each subcontract  shall  contain  no  less  protective
terms  than  the  Data  Processing  Terms  Section  of  the  OS  Terms,  and
Microsoft will notify the client of any new subcontractor participating in the
provision of the services with at least 14 days’ advance notice. The clients
may terminate the services within this notice period if they do not approve
the new subcontractor.70
Microsoft  pledges to delete the client’s  data within  90  days from the
termination of the services.71 Microsoft is also obliged to provide the client
with the ability to correct, delete or block the processed data, or make such
corrections, deletions or blockages on their behalf.72
With regard to location of the data processing, Microsoft warrants that it
will store the most sensitive part of the data of clients from the EU in that
region.73 With regard to other data Microsoft is and will remain certified for
66 Sections  6  para.  a  and 9  of  the  Microsoft  2015,  Microsoft  Online  Subscription  Agreement,
viewed  13  February  2015  ,  <portal.office.com/Commerce/Mosa.aspx?cl=en&cc=en-UK>
(available  only upon registration  for  the  services,  no  up to  date  and publicly  available
wording was found).
67 Section 6 para. b of the  Microsoft 2015,  Microsoft Online Subscription Agreement, viewed 13
February 2015 , <portal.office.com/Commerce/Mosa.aspx?cl=en&cc=en-UK> (available only
upon registration for the services, no up to date and publicly available wording was found).
68 Section 2 para. d of the  Microsoft 2015,  Microsoft Online Subscription Agreement, viewed 13
February 2015 , <portal.office.com/Commerce/Mosa.aspx?cl=en&cc=en-UK> (available only
upon registration for the services, no up to date and publicly available wording was found).
69 General  Privacy  and  Security  Terms  Section,  Use  of  Subcontractors  Subsection  of  the
Microsoft  2015,  Online  Services  Terms  January  1,  2015,  viewed  13  February  2015,
<http://www.microsoftvolumelicensing.com/Downloader.aspx?DocumentId=8248>.
70 Data  Processing  Terms  Section,  Privacy  Subsection  para.  Subcontractor  Transfer  of  the
Microsoft  2015,  Online  Services  Terms  January  1,  2015,  viewed  13  February  2015,
<http://www.microsoftvolumelicensing.com/Downloader.aspx?DocumentId=8248>.
71 Data Retention Section of the Microsoft 2015, Online Services Terms January 1, 2015, viewed
13  February  2015,  <http://www.microsoftvolumelicensing.com/Downloader.aspx?
DocumentId=8248>.
72 Data Processing Terms Section,  Additional European Terms Subsection,  para.  Customer
Data Access of the Microsoft 2015, Online Services Terms January 1, 2015, viewed 13 February
2015, <http://www.microsoftvolumelicensing.com/Downloader.aspx?DocumentId=8248>.
73 Data Processing Terms Section, Location of Customer Data at Rest Subsection para. Office
365 Services of the Microsoft 2015, Online Services Terms January 1, 2015, viewed 13 February
2015, <http://www.microsoftvolumelicensing.com/Downloader.aspx?DocumentId=8248>.
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the  Safe  Harbor  program,  and  the  OS  Terms  include  the  Standard
Contractual Clauses issued by the European Commission in its Attachment
no. 3. The clauses are not modified in any way. As to possible contradictions
with  the  clauses  in  the  MOS Agreement  or  the  OS  Terms,  the  issue  is
auditing of services. The OS Terms state that the client agrees to exercise its
auditing  rights  under  the  Standard  Contractual  Clauses  by  instructing
Microsoft to execute the audit via a third party security professional as was




Altogether,  Google’s  contractual  framework  for  the  provision  of  Google
Apps  for  Work suffers  from several  deficiencies  that  may cause  conflict
with the DPD and corresponding national legislations.  The most obvious
deficiency  is  that  a  legally  compliant  data  processing  agreement  is  not
automatically concluded with clients from the EU. Instead a specific action
is  required  from  the  client,  and  its  performance  is  not  even  actively
recommended by Google. 
Furthermore, the wording of the GA Agreement concerning liability is
ambiguous,  and  the  client  must  take  into  account  the  possibility  that
Google’s liability under the agreement is strictly limited. Google is entitled
to unilaterally change the services and the security measures established to
protect personal data. The client has no right to object to Google’s choice of
subcontractors participating in the data processing. An ambiguous clause
limiting liability is added to the MCCs and a client’s right to audit under the
MCCs is limited by the DP Amendment. Both of these provisions may be
contradictory to the Standard Contractual Clause. Such a contradiction is
not compliant with the Commission Decision 2010/87/EU.
The  contract  for  Microsoft  Office  365  also  suffers  from  certain
deficiencies,  namely  the  strict  limitation  of  liability  that  applies  even to
damages  caused  by  a  breach  of  data  protection  law.  The  period  of
Microsoft’s  notice  for  a  new  subcontractor  is  rather  short.  Also  the
74 Data Processing Terms Section, Certifications and Audits Subsection of the Microsoft 2015,
Online  Services  Terms  January  1,  2015,  viewed  13  February  2015,
<http://www.microsoftvolumelicensing.com/Downloader.aspx?DocumentId=8248>.
100 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology [Vol. 9:1
regulation  of  audit  rights  in  the  OS  Terms  may  potentially  contradict
Standard Contractual Clauses.
If  the  contracts  for  both  of  the  services  are  compared from the  data
protection  perspective,  then  Microsoft  Office  365  performs  substantially
better. The most significant issue of liability limitation is not in direct breach
of  the  data  protection  law,  rather  it  only  creates  a  misbalance  in  the
contractual  framework.  On  the  other  hand,  deficiencies  of  the  GA
Agreement  are  considerable.  They  are  partly  remedied  by  the  DP
Amendment  and  the  MCCs,  but  some  of  them remain  unresolved.  EU-
based clients using Google Apps for Work are, therefore, facing a risk of
breach of data protection law and subsequent sanctions from their national
data  protection authorities,  especially  if  they have not  opted for  the DP
Amendment and the MCCs.
4.2 LEGAL FRAMEWORK
From a legal perspective, cloud providers and cloud clients and especially
SMEs may face several issues related to the most frequent cloud services.75
Firstly,  the differences  between the  national  implementation  of  the  DPD
complicate the situation for the providers who may struggle to provide a
unified  service  with  terms  that  would  be  found  compliant  with  data
protection law in all EU member states.
Secondly, not all the requirements are expressly stated in the legislation
and clients must therefore study the guidance issued by various authorities
to ensure they meet all of them. Subsequently, a client may face difficulty
when trying to identify their own obligations and subsequently assess the
product of the provider. 
Thirdly, in many cases, the data processed using the services will contain
only a limited portion of personal data and this data will not be considered
as sensitive by their subjects. In these cases, the obligations laid on the client
as a data controller may be disproportionate. On the other hand, in cases
where large amounts of data are processed using a cloud service, the data
protection framework may lack sufficient detail to effectively regulate the
relationship.76 
Lastly,  the core  issue  that  arose  from the  discussion  above regarding
contracts is the imbalance in liability between the controller and processor.
75 Eurostat, supra note 3. 
76 For example, with regard to the security measures that should be implemented in such case.
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The current legal framework makes the cloud client, as a controller, almost
solely liable for the processing, allowing the cloud provider to contractually
limit their liability to a minimum.77 
The  current  legal  framework  is,  therefore,  lacking  with  regard  to
unification, clarity and scalability. The General Data Protection Regulation
proposed  by  the  European  Commission78 as  amended  by  the  European
Parliament79 (GDPR) aims to address some of these challenges. One of the
main ambitions of the regulation is to unify the legal framework for data
protection in the EU.80 As a regulation with direct applicability the GDPR
has  good  chances  of  meeting  this  expectation.  Furthermore,  it  contains
provisions  addressing  co-operation  and  consistency  among  the
independent national data protection authorities.81 However, there are still
questions that remain unresolved with regard to unification,  for example
the  co-existence  of  the  GDPR  with  national  and  EU-wide  rules  on  the
processing of personal data in specific sectors such as telecommunications,
healthcare or financial services.82
On top of that, not all the duties of the data controller are stated more
clearly in the GDPR in comparison to the DPD. The wording proposed by
the European Commission contained an obligation of the controller to audit
the effectiveness of the security measures,83 but this obligation was removed
and  replaced  by  a  more  general  obligation.  Furthermore,  the  GDPR
77 McGillivray comes to a similar conclusion, see McGillivray, supra note 27, p. 250.
78 European Commission 2012,  Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data nd on the free
movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), COM/2012/011 final,  viewed 15
February  2015  ,  <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?
uri=CELEX:52012PC0011&from=EN>.
79 European Parliament 12 March 2014, Legislative resolution of 12 March 2014 on the proposal for
a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement  of such data (General  Data
Protection  Regulation)‘,  viewed  15  February  2015,
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2014-
0212&language=EN>.
80 This is also anticipated by the European Commission. European Commission 27 September
2012,  Unleashing  the  Potential  of  Cloud  Computing  in  Europe,  viewed  15  February  2015,
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0529:FIN:EN:PDF>.
81 Chapter VII of the  European Parliament 12 March 2014,  Legislative resolution of 12 March
2014  on  the  proposal  for  a  regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  the
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of
such  data  (General  Data  Protection  Regulation)‘,  viewed  15  February  2015,
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2014-
0212&language=EN>.
82 See  Kotschy,  W  2014,  ‚The  proposal  for  a  new  General  Data  Protection  Regulation—
problems solved?‘,  International Data Privacy Law, 2014, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 276 or Blume, P
2014,  ‘The  myths  pertaining  to  the  proposed  General  Data  Protection  Regulation‘,
International Data Privacy Law, 2014, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 269-273.
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mandates  the  European  Commission  to  issue  numerous  by-laws  and
implementing  acts  creating  potentially  unclear  borders  between  binding
and non-binding rules.  Whether the GDPR will  clarify the obligations of
clients and providers in cloud computing is therefore at least questionable.
As a positive aspect it must be highlighted that the GDPR clearly states
that it  does not limit  the application of the ECD and, therefore, exempts
providers of IaaS cloud services from the scope of certain data protection
obligations.84 Also the extended obligations of the processor with regard to
documentation,  co-operation  with  data  protection  authorities,  security
measures, impact assessment and compliance reviews may be perceived as
an improvement.85 Additionally, the concept of processing sectors that may
be declared  as  areas  with  an adequate  level  of  protection  may facilitate
international data transfers in cloud computing.86 The GDPR also tackles the
issue  of  subcontracting,  but  the  currently  proposed  wording  is  very
general.87 Despite  these  improvements  in  flexibility  and  assignment  of
liability,  much  more  could  be  done.  Instead  of  merging  the  roles  of
processor and controller in one responsible subject with scaled obligations
and liability, the GDPR follows the original dichotomy introduced by the
DPD. Furthermore, the GDPR does not contain a true de minimis  clause
that would exempt small scale, low-risk processing from its scope. The size
of the processing  simply  influences  the less important  obligations  of the
controller88 and additional  obligations of the controller are added.89 With
83 Article 22 para 3 of the European Parliament 12 March 2014, Legislative resolution of 12 March
2014  on  the  proposal  for  a  regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  the
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of
such  data  (General  Data  Protection  Regulation)‘,  viewed  15  February  2015,
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2014-
0212&language=EN>.
84 Article  3  para  3  of  the  Article  22  para  3  of  the  European  Parliament  12  March  2014,
Legislative resolution of 12 March 2014 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament
and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and
on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation)‘, viewed 15 February
2015,  <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2014-
0212&language=EN>. See Sartor, supra note 14.
85 Articles 28, 29, 30, 33 and 33a of the GDPR, supra note 78, as amended by the European
Parliament. See also Blume, P 2015, ‘It Is Time for Tomorrow: EU Data Protection Reform
and the Internet’, Journal Of Internet Law, vol. 18, no. 8, p. 7.
86 Article 41 of the GDPR, supra note 78. See also Blume, P. 2015, supra note 88, p. 9.
87 Article 26 para. 2(d) of the GDPR, supra note 78, as amended by the European Parliament.
The original wording proposed by the Commission was more strict and less ambiguous. See
also McGillivray, supra note 27, p. 248.
88 Such as the appointment of a data protection officer. Article 35 para 1(b) of the GDPR, supra
note 78.
89 Reding,  V 2012, ‘The European data protection framework for the twenty-first  century’,
International Data Privacy Law, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 119-129.
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regard to liability,  the processor  still  does not share primary liability  for
security and compliance with the controller regarding the processing in its
entirety.90
In short, with regard to the improvements in cloud computing expected
from the GDPR, these will probably not be brought about by adoption of
the currently proposed text.  Its  future reviews should therefore focus on
clarification, simplification, scaling and balancing liability.
Nevertheless,  whether the GDPR should be beneficial  to cloud clients
and providers or not, it will not come into force in the close future, nor for
that matter will any other amendment to the DPD. Therefore, cloud clients
have to find solutions as to how to effectively assess  the offers of cloud
providers and ensure compliance of the offered processing with the DPD.
With regard to this  challenge,  the European Commission established the
Cloud  Select  Industry  Group  and  its  subgroup  aimed  at  service  level
agreement  standardisation.  This  subgroup  issued  Cloud  Service  Level
Agreement Standardisation Guidelines.91 
The guidelines are built  around the concept of service level objectives
which  also  cover  data  protection  issues.  The  coverage  is  detailed  and
reflects the recommendations of Article 29 of the Data Protection Working
Party.  The  relevant  service  level  objectives  include  certification,  purpose
specification,  data  minimization,  retention  and  disclosure  limitation,
transparency and notice, accountability, data location and handling of data
subjects’ requests. Besides this, specific service level objectives for security
are also included, such as authentication and authorization, cryptography,
security  incident  management,  logging  and  monitoring,  auditing  and
security  verification.  The  guidelines  also  address  performance  and  data
management.  For  each  service  level  objective  the  guidelines  provide  its
context, the explanation why it is needed and a description of how it should
be addressed in an agreement. According to the experience of the author,
the  guidelines  are  very  useful  in  both  assessing  and  drafting  data
processing agreements for cloud computing.
90 The processor is not included in Article 22 para. 1 of the GDPR, supra note 78. See  also
Blume, P 2015, supra note 88, p. 7. However, McGillivray argues that not all liability should
be transferred to the processor, see McGillivray, supra note 27, p. 248.
91 Cloud Select Industry Group – Subgroup on Service Level Agreement 24 June 2014, Cloud
Service  Level  Agreement  Standardisation  Guidelines,  viewed  15  February  2015,
<http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/cf/dae/document.cfm?
action=display&doc_id=6138  >.
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5. CONCLUSION
Provision of cloud services to clients based in the EU may often fall under
the scope of European data protection law represented by the DPD. Cloud
clients  and  providers  may  be  assigned  different  roles  under  the  DPD
according to the nature of the processing. The client is in most cases a data
controller. The provider may be also a data controller if they process the
personal  data  for  their  own  purposes,  such  as  advertising,  or  a  data
processor if they only act on the instructions of the client. They may also not
fall under the scope of the DPD if they qualify as a hosting provider under
the ECD, by not being aware of the nature of the data processed using their
service. 
In cases where the cloud provider is a data processor, such as with the
SaaS  solutions  where  it  is  obvious  from  the  design  of  the  service  that
personal  data  will  be  processed,  the  relationship  between  the  cloud
provider and the cloud client must be governed by a contract. This contract
must state that the provider is bound by the instructions of the client, must
describe  the  scope  of  the  client’s  instructions  and  the  purpose  of  the
processing  and  types  of  data  processed.  Furthermore  the  contract  must
describe security measures, the methods of proving provider’s compliance
with these measures and remedies for a case of their non-compliance. The
contract must not allow for unilateral changes to material provisions and
must regulate the use of subcontractors by the provider. If the data is to be
processed outside the EU and countries with adequate level of protection,
the  provider  must  be  Safe  Harbor  certified  for  the  USA,  and  for  other
countries the contract must contain the Standard Contractual Clauses issued
by the European Commission.
The  contractual  framework  for  the  provision  of  Microsoft  Office  365
seems to be compliant with the above listed requirements except for minor
deficiencies and an imbalance in liability. The contractual structure for the
provision of Google Apps for Work suffers from more severe deficiencies
that may render it non-compliant with the national data protection laws of
EU  member  states.  To  ensure  at  least  a  minimal  level  of  compliance,
additional operations of the client are required. Google also strongly limits
the right of the client to audit, as well as its own liability towards the client.
The contract also enables unilateral changes of its essential provisions by
Google. 
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The current legal framework for data protection in the provision of cloud
services  lacks  unification,  clarity  and  scalability.  With  exception  to
unification,  the  GDPR  is  not  expected  to  bring  about  a  substantial
improvement if it is adopted with the current wording. 
To cope with the problems arising from the interaction of cloud contracts
with  current  European  data  protection  law  as  represented  by  the  DPD,
cloud  clients  and  providers  may  use  Cloud  Service  Level  Agreement
Standardisation Guidelines to draft and assess data processing agreements.
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